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The discovery system of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure con-
tains a curious gap. Rule 34(a)(1) provides discovery of parties' docu-
ments and tangible things;' Rule 34(a)(2), of parties' land;2 and Rule
45(d), of nonparties' documents and tangible things.3 However, no rule
provides discovery of nonparties' land.4 The 1970 amendments to the
Rules addressed this limitation by adding Rule 34(c), which reads:
"This rule [34] does not preclude an independent action against a
person not a party for production of documents and things and per-
mission to enter upon land." This provision has given rise to con-
fusion and uncertainty among practitioners5 but as yet to no reported
decisions;6 commentators treat it cursorily.
7
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) provides:
Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and permit the
party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy, any
designated documents .... or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible
things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which
are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is
served ....
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) continues:
[O]r (2) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession
or control of the party upon whom the request is served for the purpose of inspec-
tion and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property
or any designated object or operation thereon, within the scope of Rule 26(b).
The phrase "other property" refers to structures and large objects, such as a ship or a
machine, which cannot be brought into a deposition room. 4A J. MooRE, FEDERAL P McIrtcE
f[ 34.18 at 34-102 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as MooRE]; see Notes of Advisory Com-
mittee on 1970 Amendment to Rules, FED. R. Civ. P. 34, 28 U.S.C. app., at 7794 (1970)
(Rule 34(a) now provides testing and sampling of "objects or operations on land"; Rule
34(c) motivated by occasional need for inspection of "large tangible things" as well as
land). This Note refers only to "land," although the analysis applies as well to "other
property" within the scope of Rule 34(a)(2).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1) provides:
The subpoena [for taking a deposition] may command the person to whom it is
directed to produce and permit inspection and copying of designated books, papers,
documents, or tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope
of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) ....
4. The language of Rule 34(a) clearly restricts it to parties. See note I supra and 4A
MooRE, supra note 2, ff 34.05[l]; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEoUE § 2209 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]; 2A W. BARRON & A. HoLTz-
OFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 791 (C. Wright ed. 1961). Unlike the Federal
Rules, a number of state procedural codes expressly permit inspection of the land of
any person. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra at 619-20.
5. See NEw FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY RULES SOURCEBOOK 126-30 (PLI Litigation Source-
book Ser. No. 4, W. Treadwell ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DIscovERY SOURCEBOOK].
6. But cf. United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1398, 1402 (10th Cir. 1974)
(upholding district court's discretion to quash subpoena duces tecum for production of
reports from appraisals made for private landowners not parties to condemnation case;
passing reference to Rule 34(c)).
7. See, e.g., 4A MOORE, supra note 2, It 34.22; 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, §
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This Note examines Rule 34(c) and the independent actions to
which it might refer. The Note argues that such actions are ineffec-
tive in obtaining inspection of nonparty land and, even if expanded
to become effective, are inconsistent with the policies underlying the
discovery system of the Federal Rules. The Note then proposes further
action by the draftsmen of the Federal Rules to shape a discovery tool
for nonparty land within the framework of the Rules.
I. Background and Purpose of Rule 34(c)
The need to obtain discovery of nonparty land may arise in a variety
of situations: to inspect an allegedly defective machine in a suit against
its manufacturer by a worker injured at his job and barred by a work-
men's compensation statute from joining his employer as a defendant;8
to inspect the site of a plane crash in a mass tort action; to obtain
an appraisal of neighboring land in a condemnation proceeding; 9 to
test the soil or water of land adjacent to the plaintiff's in an action
against an alleged polluter; 10 or to inspect land which was owned by
a party at the time the cause of action arose but has since been trans-
ferred. This need was brought to the attention of the Advisory Com-
mittee in drafting the 1970 amendments to Rule 34. In its note ac-
companying the 1967 preliminary draft, which did not include the
present subdivision (c), the Committee explained that a suggestion
had been made to authorize a court to order nonparties to permit
entry on land." Observing that neither the reported cases nor the
commentators had shown the need for this provision, the Committee
2209; Kalmus, Discovery of Documents and Things, in DISCOVERY SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 5, at 119, 125-26.
8. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 2209, at 619. See also 4A MooRa, supra note 2,
34.22; Backlund v. General Motors Corp., 352 Mass. 776, 226 N.E.2d 555 (1967) (rescript
opinion). Cf. Humphries v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 177, 181 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (action
by an employee of a steel plant against a railroad company for personal injuries sustained
through the negligence of the railroad which operated its freight cars on the premises
of the steel plant; inspection of the site of the accident denied because steel company,
which owned and controlled the premises, was not a party).
9. Cf. United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1398, 1402 (10th Cir. 1974)
(discovery of appraisal reports for neighboring land sought in condemnation proceeding).
One method of valuation in condemnation proceedings is to use the price at which com-
parable property has recently been sold. See 7 NIcHoLs' THE LAW OF EuINENT Do,IAx
f 4.081] (rev. 3d ed. P. Rohan & M. Reskin 1975). Inspection of nonparty land may be
necessary to establish the "comparability" of land used for the valuation.
10. Cf. Martin v. Reynolds Metal Corp., 297 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1961) (in suit by land-
owners for damage to cattle caused by aluminum plant's effluents, prospective defendant
allowed to test soil and vegetation on affected land).
11. Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for
the United States District Courts relating to Deposition and Discovery, 43 F.R.D. 211,
255-57 (1967).
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invited reports of difficulties from the bar.' 2 By the time the final ver-
sion of the proposed amendments was prepared, such reports'" had con-
vinced the Committee that it was occasionally necessary to inspect land
in the possession of a nonparty.
1 4
Rather than provide directly for discovery against nonparties by a
provision in the Rules,'3 the Advisory Committee chose to solve a
more limited problem. Some courts had dismissed independent dis-
covery actions for inspection of nonparty land on the ground that
Rule 34(a), which provides inspection of a party's land, was preemp-
tive.' 6 The Committee added Rule 34(c), which simply makes clear
that such independent actions are not precluded.' 7 Since the Rule con-
tains no language which authorizes discovery of nonparty land,s the
availability of such discovery depends entirely on whatever indepen-
dent action might be brought.
II. Independent Actions
The drafters of Rule 34(c) apparently contemplated that the courts
would revive the former bill in equity for discovery.', Before discovery
practice was codified, 20 the bill was the primary means for obtaining
discovery both at law and in equity; 2' it was used to extend the limited
12. Id. at 257.
13. There were "something like half a dozen" reports. DISCOVERY SOURCEBOOr, supra
note 5, at 128 (remarks by Prof. [now Dean] Albert Sacks).
14. Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendment to Rules, FED. R. CIv. 1. 34(c),
28 U.S.C. app., at 7794 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Note].
15. See pp. 120-21 infra.
16. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 14; cf. Amand v. Pennsylvania R.R., 17
F.R.D. 290 (D.N.J. 1955) (independent action for discovery in aid of proceeding before a
labor arbitration board dismissed because Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preempt any
previously existing discovery devices).
17. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 14.
18. According to its Reporter, the Committee intended that no such authorization be
implied and that the shaping of a discovery device, if one were to exist at all, be
left to the courts. Telephone interview with Dean Albert Sacks, Harvard Law School,
May 30, 1975 (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
19. The Advisory Committee Note, supra note 14, stated that "some courts hale
dismissed independent actions in the nature of bills in equity for such discover v" and
then added that Rule 34 does not preclude "independent actions" against nonparties
(emphasis added).
20. Codification of discovery practice began in the states and in England in the
mid-19th century. While the bill remained alive in some jurisdictions, it was more
frequently preempted if riot abolished outright by such codifications. See generally G.
RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932).
21. Historically, the bill in equity for discovery evolved in response to the common
law constraint which prevented parties from testifying. This constraint prevented the
plaintiff from proving his case when vital information was known only to the defendant.
In courts of equity, however, the defendant was obliged to respond under oath to his
opponent's factual allegations. It became customary to attach interrogatories to bills in
equity, and discovery became incidental to equitable proceedings. These interrogatories
grew into an independent equitable remedy, the "pure" bill of discovery, which could
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discovery available in federal practice 22 until 1938, when the discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rendered it largely
obsolete.
23
In its historical form the bill is not capable of filling the gap to
which Rule 34(c) is addressed. Although the bill traditionally afforded
inspection of land,'2 4 it ran only against parties .2  There were certain
limited exceptions to this rule; the bill would lie against real parties
in interest and parties' representatives and agents,2 6 and against any
also be brought in aid of an action at law. See Millar, The Mechanism of Fact Discovery,
32 ILL. L. REV. 261, 424, 437-52 (1937); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 940, 946-50 (1961). See generally E. BRAY, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY
(1885); T. HARE, TREATISE ON DISCOVERY OF EVIDENCE BY BILL AND ANSWER IN EQUITY
(2d Am. ed. 1849); C. LANGDELL, A SUMMsARY OF EQUITY PLEADING §§ 167-81 (2d ed. 1883);
1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 190-207 (5th ed. 1941); 2 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1928-56 (14th ed. 1918); 6 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1845-47 (3d ed. 1940); J. WVIGRAM, POINTS IN THE LAW OF DISCOVERY (1st Am.
ed. 1841).
22. For a discussion of the limitations on discovery in federal practice before the
Rules, see 4 MooRE, supra note 2, . 26.03; 4A MOORE fT 33.03, 34.03; Pike & Willis, The
New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38 CoLu.Mt. L. REV. 1179, 1181-84 (1938).
The bill was used principally in aid of actions at law. See, e.g., Pressed Steel Car Co.
v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (bill in aid of law action afforded inspec-
tion of documents where production at trial under subpoena duces tecum would have
been impractical). In suits in equity, former Equity Rule 58 permitted a party to submit
to his opponent interrogatories, requests for the production of documents, and requests
for admission of the genuineness of documents. Rules of Practice for the Courts of
Equity of the United States, 198 F. v, xxxiv (1912). But the equity bill could be used to
obtain discovery in situations not covered by the Equity Rule. See, e.g., Arms & Drury,
Inc. v. Burg, 90 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (suit in equity to void deeds; discovery ob-
tained from sales agent to identify purchasers of deeds).
23. 4 MOORE, supra note 2, f 26.53. The Rules do not permit discovery in advance of
an action for the purpose of obtaining facts on which to base a complaint. Id. ff 27.07[4].
Hence the bill may still be useful to enable a plaintiff to find out whom he should sue.
Id. fj 26.53; see note 27 infra.
24. The bill was originally used to obtain admissions, and was later extended to
afford production of documents and tangible things and inspection of land. See, e.g.,
Thornburgh v. Savage Mining Co., 23 F. Cas. 1113 (No. 13,986) (C.C.D. Nev. 1867) (in-
spection of land in action for underground trespass); 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 21, §
207b; 6 J. 'WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 1862.
25. See Dehne v. Hillman Inv. Co., 110 F.2d 456, 458 (3d Cir. 1940) ("At common law
a bill of discovery was demurrable if it lay against a defendant who was a mere wit-
ness."); 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 1856d, at 439 ("The principle of a bill of dis-
covery was never considered to be applicable to third persons not parties so as to secure
from them before trial a disclosure of possible evidence .... ); T. HARE, supra note 21,
at 67 (discovery confined to party of record). For an explanation of the origins of this
restriction, see note 21 supra. The only jurisdiction which has rejected the limitation of
the bill to parties appears to be New Hampshire. See Therrien v. Public Serv. Co., 99
N.H. 197, 108 A.2d 48 (1954); Lefebvre v. Somersworth Shoe Co., 93 N.H. 354, 41 A.2d 924
(1945).
26. See, e.g.; Finance Co. of America v. Brock, 80 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1936) (discovery
allowed from corporate officers in action against corporation); Huey v. Brown, 171
F. 641 (3d Cir. 1909) (broker holding stock as agent compelled to reveal identity of owner
in action by corporation's receiver to collect assessment against stockholders); American
Sec. & Trust Co. v. Brooks, 225 Mass. 500, 502, 114 N.E. 732 (1917) (discovery not avail-
able from mere witness, but 6nly from parties, members and officers of corporation,
parties' agents, or persons against whom relief could be obtained in the main action);
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person not a party to compel disclosure of the identity of the proper
defendant.27 As a general matter, however, the bill could not provide
discovery of nonparty land .
2
Although the equity bill in its historical form fails to provide the
needed discovery, it has been broadened in scope from time to time
by judicial action 29 and might be expanded to provide discovery from
a nonparty. But an equity bill running against nonparties poses a
serious jurisdictional problem. The traditional bill for discovery was
considered ancillary to the main action;" hence it did not have to
Macclesfield v. Davis, 35 Eng. Rep. 385 (Ch. 1814) (discovery from defendant's banker
who was considered owner's agent and had custody of chattels sought to be inspected);
E. BRAy, supra note 21, at 39-40 (discovery only from parties and persons in community
of interest with them); I J. PoMEROY, su1pra note 21, § 199(a) (bill would lie against
real party in interest).
27. See, e.g., Arms & Drury, Inc. v. Burg, 90 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (in action to
void deeds, discovery from sales agent to identify purchasers of deeds); Huey v. Brown,
171 F. 641 (3d Cir. 1909) (in action by corporation's receiver to collect assessment, against
stockholders, broker holding stock as agent compelled to reveal owner's identity); Coca-
Cola Co. v. Atlanta, 152 Ga. 558, 110 S.E. 730 (1922); Bluefield Supply Co. N. Broome,
121 W. Va. 584, 5 S.E.2d 530 (1939) (labor union forced to reveal identity of members
who had made unauthorized contract with petitioner); Orr v. Diaper, 4 Ch. D. 92
(1876) (shipper forced to reveal identity of manufacturer of goods bearing counterfeit
trademarks); Heathecote v. Fleete, 23 Eng. Rep. 883 (Ch. 1702) (bill to discover identity
of owner of a barge whose operator had negligently damaged the goods of the pros-
pective plaintiff); Note, Equity's Bill for Discovery: A Unique Application in the Field
of Products Liability. 49 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 124 (1972) (proposal to use discovery bill in
advance of action in order to increase the information available to prospective plaintiffs
in state and federal actions).
28. There are two cases which might be cited in support of a bill to obtain such
discovery. In an early federal case, a circuit court issued the broad dictum that bills
for discovery are not confined to parties but can be brought against any person in-
terested in the action at law who has possession of the evidence sought. Under the
facts of the case, however, the respondent to the bill was the real party in interest in
the main action. Griesa v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 F. 509, 514 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
215 U.S. 600 (1909) (disinterment of body ordered in action by insurance company to
void policy because of decedent insured's alleged suicide; defendant was decedent's
administrator and owner of burial plot was decedent's widow, the chief beneficiary
of the insurance policy and hence the real party in interest).
More recently a state court granted a plaintiff entry on a nonparty's land to inspect
defendant's property to which defendant had a right of access. At the same time,
however, the court approved the rule that bills of discovery do not run against non-
parties, and found the case at bar distinguishable. MacPherson v. Boston Edison Co.,
336 Mass. 94, 142 N.E.2d 758 (1957).
29. See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 693 (1933)
(Cardozo, J.) ("[w]hen this necessity [for discovery] is made out with reasonable cer-
tainty, a bill in equity is maintainable to give [the litigant] what he needs"; discovery
of damages in patent infringement suit allowed before liability determined); Brown
v. McDonald, 133 F. 897 (3d Cir. 1905) (first case in which federal court gave discovery
to identify unknown defendant); Shimadzu v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 6 F. Supp.
393 (E.D. Pa. 1934) (entry upon premises to observe defendant's production process
where prima facie case of patent infringement established and direct observation only
feasible method of proving disputed facts); Levin v. Cleveland Welding Co., 187 N.E.2d
187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (equitable discovery extended to chattels where in that
jurisdiction it had traditionally reached only documents).
30. Loft, Inc. v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 103 F.2d 1, 9-10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308
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satisfy separate federal jurisdictional or venue provisions. 31 Presum-
ably ancillary jurisdiction would also exist for a discovery bill running
against a nonparty.32 However, the problem of personal jurisdiction
is not so easily solved. When an ancillary action is brought against a
nonparty, personal service must be effected.33 For this reason, the bill
would often fail when the landowner resides outside the state where
the main action is brought.
34
In addition to its failure to run against nonparties, a number of
other traditional limitations35 on the use of the bill would have to
be overcome. Equitable discovery was generally limited to informa-
tion relevant to a party's own claims and defenses.30 Furthermore,
it was available only to the plaintiff, so that a defendant seeking dis-
covery had to file a cross complaint in order to obtain discovery. 37
U.S. 558 (1939); Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 63 F.2d 778, 779-80
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 739 (1933); Zolla v. Grand Rapids Store Equip. Corp.,
46 F.2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
31. 1 MooIx, supra note 2, ffff 0.90[3], at 828, 0.140[8], at 1334-35; 2A MOORE IT
8.07[5]; 13 WRIGHT 9: MILLER, supra note 4, § 3523, at 56 &- cases cited in nn.l-2.
32. That ancillary jurisdiction may exist over a proceeding against a person not a
party to the main action is shown by FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a), which provides that a person
may file a verified petition in federal court seeking to perpetuate his own testimony "or
that of another person." The petition to perpetuate testimony, which may run against
nonparty witnesses, is cognizable in the federal courts under the principle of ancillary
jurisdiction. 4 MooRE, supra note 2, ff 27.03. The Rule 27(a) petition is based on the
equitable bill to perpetuate testimony, which also ran against nonparties. In a comment
appended to a draft of Rule 27, the Advisory Committee interpreted Union Solvents
Corp. v. Butacet Corp., 2 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1933), to hold that an equitable bill to
perpetuate testimony was not ancillary but instead required its own federal jurisdictional
grounds. 4 MooRE, supra note 2, f 27.03, at 181 n.4. The Advisory Committee's view of
Union Solvents seems wrong. The Committee did not explain its interpretation, and while
some commentators have accepted it uncritically, 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 2072,
at 335 n.14, Professor Moore has persuasively argued against it. 4 MooRE, supra. Moreover,
if the Committee were correct that the bill to perpetuate testimony required independent
grounds of federal jurisdiction, then the provision in Rule 27(a) for an ancillary pe-
tition to perpetuate testimony expands the jurisdiction of the district courts against
the command of Rule 82, which provides that the Rules may not "extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the United States district courts .... Assuming that Rule 27(a) is valid,
the equitable bill to perpetuate testimony must also have been ancillary.
33. 2 MOoRE, supra note 2, fT 4.13, at 1060-61; 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4,
§ 3523, at 72.
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident could be obtained
by use of a state long-arm statute. 2 MOORE, supra note 2, IT 4.42[l], [2].
If the problem of personal service were circumvented by filing the bill in the district
court in the state of residence of the respondent from whom discovery were sought,
then the court would lack the ancillary jurisdiction needed to entertain discovery bills
in the federal courts. See cases cited in note 30 supra (bills allowed on ground that
main action pending in same jurisdiction).
35. For a survey of the restrictions on use of the bill, including others not men-
tioned in the text, see 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 21, §§ 201-07, 207b.
36. There is, however, a split of authority concerning this limitation. 4 MOORE, supra
note 2, f 26.03[l]; P. DYER-SstITt, FEDERAL EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL AND DEPOSMIONS
PRACTICE §§ 17 n.12, 248 (1939).
37. 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 21, § 198, at 301.
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Finally, the granting of the bill was discretionary.35 Although none
of these problems is insurmountable, the process of adapting the ar-
chaic equity bill to provide a modem discovery tool for nonparty land
would entail considerable litigation, with attendant cost, uncertainty,
and inconsistency. 39
Although the most significant, the equity bill is not the only inde-
pendent action which might be brought for discovery of nonparty land.
It is conceivable that the action to perpetuate testimony, expressly pre-
served by Rule 27(c), could serve as the basis for the judicial creation
of the independent action to which Rule 34(c) refers.40 Although this
action can be brought against a nonparty witness, it is available only
to obtain evidence known to exist and hence would be even more
difficult to transform into a discovery device for nonparty land than
the discovery bill.4 1 Another possible independent action would be
a petition for one of the extraordinary writs under the All Writs
Statute.42 This statute can be used by the district courts to afford
discovery in actions not covered by the Rules, such as habeas corpus
proceedings, 43 but cannot be used in actions to which the Rules ap-
38. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 696-97 (1933).
The bill may even have been subject to denial without a statement of reasons. See Top
Value Enterprises, Inc. v. Borrelli, 350 Mass. 722, 216 N.E.2d 874 (1966).
39. For example, although the independent discovery action would be governed by the
Federal Rules, 4 MOORE, supra note 2, ff 26.53, at 26-104, practitioners have expressed
concern that the party bringing the discovery action might fail to give notice to the
other parties as required by the Rules. See DISCOVERY SOURCEIOOK, supra note 5, at 126-30.
40. For an exposition of the origins of this action in the ancient equity bills to
take depositions de bene esse and under dedimus potestatem, see 1 J. POMEROY, supra
note 21, §§ 210-11, 213-14; 2 T. STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE §§ 1765-91 (1909). In a
few jurisdictions the old equity bills for the preservation of testimony have provided
the historical foundations for the creation of modern discovery devices. See G. XGtLAND,
supra note 20, at 20-21, 50.
41. See J. POMEROY, supra note 21, §§ 210-11; 2 T. STREET, supra note 40, §§ 1765-91
(limitations on the scope and purpose of the bills to perpetuate testimony; narrowly
defined prerequisites for invoking the bills); see also 4 MOORE, supra note 2, § 26.03[l]
(limitations under federal statutes codifying bills).
42. The All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970), provides that "courts . . . may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agree-
able to the usages and principles of law." See Blair, A Guide to the New Federal
Discovery Practice, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 58, 72 n.62 (1971).
43. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298-300 (1969) (FED. R. Civ. P. not applicable
to habeas corpus proceedings, but § 1651 authorizes courts to fashion appropriate dis-
covery procedure; statute is a "'legislatively approved source of procedural instruments
designed to achieve the 'rational ends of law'. "). The proposed federal habeas corpus
rules likewise refer the question of discovery to the discretion of the court. See Habeas
Corpus Rule 6, § 2255, COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FED. RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS, PROPOSED RULES
GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO THE FED. RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 62-64, 113-14 (prelim. draft,
Jan. 1973). Tribunals to which the Federal Rules do not apply may also use § 1651
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ply.44 Moreover, a court may not issue the writ to a person over whom
it has not already acquired jurisdiction;4a hence the writ would gen-
erally not be available for discovery from nonparties.
The fundamental objection to an independent discovery action,
regardless of the form it may take, is that it is contrary to the policies
represented by the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules. The pur-
pose of these provisions was to replace the unrelated and haphazard
devices which had developed by a process of historical accretion with
an integrated and efficient system of pretrial investigation; 46 simpler
procedures were substituted for the cumbersome bill in equity of the
former practice.47 This purpose was reaffirmed by the 1970 amend-
ments to the Rules, which further reduced judicial involvement 48 and
eliminated it altogether from Rule 34(a). 49 It was surely inconsistent
to provide extrajudicial discovery of parties' land in one section of
Rule 34 and at the same time to resurrect independent actions for
discovery of nonparties' land in another section.50
to create their own discovery tools. See Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655 (7th
Cir. 1961) (in proceeding upon petition by NLRB to hold employer in civil con-
tempt, special master appointed by court of appeals could order discovery of Board's
documents); Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 126, 127 (1st Cir. 1941)
(per curiam) (discovery order by court of appeals in action challenging NLRB deci-
sion); Kamen Soap Prod. Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 430, 438 (Ct. CL. 1953) (sub-
poena available even though not expressly authorized by Court of Claims discovery
rules).
44. Neuwirth v. Merin, 267 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (since list of stockholders in
derivative action not discoverable under the FED. R. Civ. P., court has no basis for
mandamus compelling production).
45. Commercial See. Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 456 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir.
1972) ("court may not [by an order under § 1651] acquire jurisdiction over an individual
or property not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction"); Morrow v. District of Columbia,
417 F.2d 728, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dictum); 9 MooRE, supra note 2, ff 110.29, at 318.
46. See Pike & Willis, supra note 22, at 1186; 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4,
§ 2002, at 21 (FED. R. Civ. P. 26 through 37 intended to take the best of English and
state practices and make them available in federal courts, where previous discovery
mechanisms had been cumbersome and restricted).
47. See 4 MooRE, supra note 2, 26.03[l], at 26-82.
48. Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning 1970 Amendments of the
Discovery Rules, 28 U.S.C. app., at 7772 (1970).
49. The amendment eliminated the requirement of a court order issued upon a
showing of good cause. 4A Moop., supra note 2, ff 34.01[7], [8].
50. The existence of Rule 27(c), which permits independent actions for the per-
petuation of testimony, might be taken as an endorsement of the place of independent
actions within the framework of the Rules. But the Rule 27(c) independent action is
not the basic discovery device for preservation of testimony; it supplements a less cum-
bersome proceeding under Rule 27(a) by occasionally providing a more convenient
venue for depositions to preserve testimony than that provided by Rule 27(a). See 4
MOORP, supra note 2, ff 27.02, 27.21. An independent action under Rule 34(c), how-
ever, would not supplement an existing provision for discovery of nonparty land. More-
over, even under Rule 27(a) preservation of testimony does not operate extrajudicially,
and hence the use of an independent action to perpetuate testimony represents a minimal
departure from the standard procedure provided by the Rules.
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Finding no suitable independent action under Rule 34(c), a court
might be tempted to grant a motion for an order compelling a non-
party to permit entry on his land.r' Such a judicial amendment to
the Rules would be improper; the courts "have no power to rewrite




III. Amending Rule 45(d) to Provide
Discovery of Nonparty Land
The Advisory Committee seems to have been aware of the limita-
tions on the use of the independent actions for discovery of nonparty
land. The Committee stated that "an ideal solution to this problem
is to provide for discovery against persons not parties in Rule 34,"
but decided not to adopt this solution because "both the jurisdictional
and procedural problems are very complex." 53
Any procedural and jurisdictional problems involved in extending
the Rules to cover inspection of nonparty land would apply equally
to the inspection of a nonparty's documents or tangible things under
Rule 45(d).54 Rule 45(d) has provided for discovery of a nonparty's
51. The court would have to assume that the drafters intended to make a nonparty's
land discoverable and that they could not have intended to preserve an illusory remedy
in Rule 34(c). Under such an assumption the court might ignore the language of 34(c)
calling for an "independent action" and interpret the Rule to authorize entry on non-
party land by court order. Cf. In re Fitzgerald, 16 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 1052, 1053
(D.D.C. 1972), criticized, 4 MOORE, supra note 2, 27.21 n.8 (Supp. 1974) (court ordered
deposition to preserve testimony for an administrative proceeding-a deposition not au-
thorized by Federal Rules-on ground that Rule 27(c), authorizing independent actions
to perpetuate testimony, would be "superfluous" if not construed to give "flexibility"
in permitting depositions to be taken).
52. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969) (applying "conventional principles of
statutory construction" to Rule 81(a)(2), Court held that discovery provisions of Federal
Rules do not extend to.habeas corpus proceedings).
53. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 14.
54. For the relevant text of Rule 45(d), see note 3 supra.
It might be argued that inspection of land located outside the district where the sub-
poena is served on the nonparty presents a problem not posed by inspection of documents
and tangible things: land, unlike documents, cannot be moved and therefore must be
inspected outside the nonparty's district. Since the subpoena generally reaches documents
under the control of the person ordered to produce, cen if the materials are outside the
district where the person is served, 5A MOORE, supra note 2, jj 45.05[l], at 45-32, the
enlarged subpoena should reach land similarly located and controlled. As a practical
matter, the inconvenience of transporting large numbers of documents will often make
it necessary to inspect them where they are kept by the nonparty. See Hogan v. Ultronic
Sys. Corp., 8 FaD. RULES SERV. 2D 45b.31, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (deposition ordered at
office of witness in order to avoid inconvenience of moving numerous documents to be
inspected); 5A MOORE, supra j 45.07[2], at 45-74 n.31 (court could order nonparty to
produce documents in a district more convenient than where subpoena served); see also
Less v. Taber Instrument Corp., 53 F.R.D. 645 (W.D.N.Y. 1971) (court ordered that depo-
sition of corporation served with a subpoena in New York should be taken in California).
Hence inspection of land outside the district where the subpoena is served should not
create difficulties which have not already been faced in document inspection.
Rule 34(c) and Discovery of Nonparty Land
documents since the adoption of the Rules in 1938 and for discovery
of a nonparty's tangible things since 1946.-; The Rule has proved a
useful discovery device which has not given rise to complex jurisdic-
tional and procedural problems. The Advisory Committee saw no such
problems in the extension of the Rule 45(d) subpoena to a non-
party's tangible things in 1946; 5( the extension has not provoked any
challenges in reported cases and has not been questioned by com-
mentators.5
7
It is quite possible that the Committee was referring to the tech-
nical problems of meshing a revised Rule 34 with other Rules. 5 The
drafting problems stem from the need to provide a mechanism for
discovery against nonparties in a Rule which now applies only to
parties. The easiest way to provide this mechanism would be to amend
Rule 45(d) to authorize a subpoena compelling a person to permit
inspection of his land. 9 Discovery of nonparty land would then fol-
It might also be argued that inspection of land would involve a greater invasion
of privacy than inspection of documents and things. See Hughes & Anderson, Discovery:
A Competition between the Right of Privacy and the Right to Know, 23 U. FLA. L. REV.
289 (1971). There is no indication, however, that such a concern motivated the Advisory
Committee.
55. See 5A MOORE, supra note 2, f 45.01[4], [5], [7], [9], 45.07.
56. The Advisory Committee simply commented that "giv[ing] the subpoena for
documents or tangible things the same scope as provided in Rule 26(b) [would promote]
uniformity." Notes of Advisory Committee on 1946 and 1948 Amendments to Rules, FED.
R. Civ. P. 45(d), 28 U.S.C. app., at 7810 (1970).
57. 5A Mooing, supra note 2, jjf 45.07[], at 45-62, 45.07[3]; 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, suJn'a
note 4, § 2454, at 425.
Rule 45(d)(1) was further amended in 1970 to make clear that the subpoena authorizes
inspection and copying of documents and tangible things, and to protect, by a procedure
analogous to Rule 34(b), the person from whom discovery is sought. Notes of Advisory
Committee on 1970 Amendments to Rules, FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d), 28 U.S.C. app., at 7811
(1970). The "plain intention" of the 1970 amendments to Rule 45(d)(1) was to make dis-
covery of documents and tangible things from a nonparty tinder a subpoena duces tecun
the same as discovery of those materials from a party under Rule 34. 5A MOORE, supra
note 2, IT 45.07[3], at 45-78.
58. Sacks interview, supra note 18. Dean Sacks has attributed the Committee's failure
to draft a discovery mechanism within the framework of the Rules to lack of time.
DISCOVERY SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 128. The language of Rule 34(c) itself is evi-
dence that the Committee ran out of time. The Rule refers to discovery actions for
the production of documents and things as well as for permission to enter upon land.
However, the refernice to "documents and things" is redundant, because production
of documents and tangible things possessed by a nonparty can be obtained with a
subpoena duces tecUm under Rule 45(d). Furthermore, the Rule should have included
"other property," such as structures, as well as land. See note 2 supra. Finally, the phrase
"permission to enter" in Rule 34(c) is more restrictive than the drafters must have in-
tended, because mere entry will not suffice unless complemented by ability to inspect.
Since there is no plausible reason why discovery on a nonparty's land should be more
limited than discovery on a party's land, "permission to enter" ought to be augmented
by permission to inspect, as in Rule 34(a).
59. A provision similar to Rule 30(b)(1) would have to be inserted in the Rules
to require that a party desiring to inspect a nonparty's land give notice to every other
party to the action. The first sentence of Rule 45(d)(l) would then be amended to
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low the procedures for discovery of nonparty documents and tangible
things.60
The Rules presently provide separately for requests to inspect par-
ties' documents, tangible things and land,"' and for subpoenas to in-
spect nonparties' documents and tangible things0 2 This organization
reflects the need for different procedural devices for obtaining dis-
covery from parties and nonparties. Following this principle, the draft-
ers should enlarge the scope of the existing nonparty discovery device,
the Rule 45(d) subpoena. The Advisory Committee adopted Rule 34
(c) only "for the present";6 3 it should take up where it left off.
authorize the clerk of the court to issue the subpoena upon proof of-service of such
notice. The second sentence of amended Rule 45(d)(1) might read as follows (new
matter in italics):
The subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to produce and
permit inspection and copying of designated books, papers, documents, or tangible
things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of the examination
permitted by Rule 26(b), and to permit entry upon designated land or other property
for the purpose of inspection within the scope permitted by Rule 31(a)(2), but in
that event the subpoena will be subject to the provisions of Rule 26(c) and sub-
division (b) of this rule.
There would have to be minor changes in the second paragraph of Rule 45(d)(1) to
authorize objections to and orders for inspection of land as well as inspection of "ma-
terials." Furthermore, Rule 27 would have to be amended to authorize inspection of non-
party land before the filing of an action or pending an appeal from a judgment of a
district court.
60. Rule 45(d) authorizes inspection of documents and tangible things in the context
of the taking of a deposition. There is no reason, however, to require a party seeking
to inspect documents-or land-to depose the person from whon inspection is sought.
See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 372 (1911); 5A MOORE, Supra note 2. '" 45.05[1,.
at 45-25 to 45-26, 45.07[l], at 45-63 to 45-64. But see McLean %. Prudential Steamship
Co., 9 FED. RuLrs SERV. 2D 45b.13 (E.D. Va. 1965).
61. Fa. R. Civ. P. 34.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d).
63. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 14.
